Design of Modern Block Ciphers

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Shannon's Main Contributions

- Notions of theoretical security and practical security
- Observation that the secret is all in the key, not in the algorithm
- **Product ciphers** and **mixing transformations** inspiration for **DES**, **AES and**
- Proof that Vernam's cipher (one-time pad) was theoretically secure

Product Cryptosystems

- To use two or more cryptosystems is to encrypt and decrypt messages consecutively. We call this a product cipher.
- He believes that a combination of an initial transposition (Permutation) with alternating substitutions and linear operations may do the trick.
- Both DES and AES use Shannon's ideas of Product System and of type Substitution Permutation Network (SPN).

Block vs Stream Ciphers

- block ciphers process messages in blocks, each of which is then en/decrypted
- like a substitution on very big characters
 - 64-bits or more
- stream ciphers process messages a bit or byte at a time when en/decrypting
- many current ciphers are block ciphers
- broader range of applications

Block Cipher Principles

- most symmetric block ciphers are based on a Feistel Cipher Structure
- needed since must be able to decrypt ciphertext to recover messages efficiently
- block ciphers look like an extremely large substitution
- would need table of 2⁶⁴ entries for a 64-bit block
- instead create from smaller building blocks
- using idea of a product cipher

Ideal Block Cipher



Claude Shannon and Substitution-Permutation Ciphers

- Claude Shannon introduced idea of substitutionpermutation (S-P) networks in 1949 paper
- form basis of modern block ciphers
- S-P nets are based on the two primitive cryptographic operations seen before:
 - *substitution* (S-box)
 - permutation (P-box)
- provide confusion & diffusion of message & key
 - diffusion dissipates statistical structure of plaintext over bulk of ciphertext
 - confusion makes relationship between ciphertext and key as complex as possible

Diffusion and Confusion

- Diffusion dissipates statistical structure of plaintext over bulk of ciphertext
- confusion makes relationship between ciphertext and key as complex as possible
- Encryption function E, C = E (K,P) Relation of (1) C, P (ii) C, K

Feistel Cipher Structure

- Horst Feistel devised the feistel cipher
 based on concept of invertible product cipher
 partitions input block into two halves
 - process through multiple rounds which
 - perform a substitution on left data half
 - based on round function of right half & subkey
 - then have permutation swapping halves
- implements Shannon's S-P net concept

Feistel Cipher Structure



Feistel Cipher Design Elements

- block size
- key size
- number of rounds
- subkey generation algorithm
- round function
- fast software en/decryption
- ease of analysis

Feistel Cipher Decryption







K₁₆

Input (ciphertext)

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- most widely used block cipher in world
- adopted in 1977 by NBS (now NIST)
 - as FIPS PUB 46
- encrypts 64-bit data using 56-bit key
- has widespread use
- has been considerable controversy over its security



Initial Permutation IP

- first step of the data computation
- IP reorders the input data bits
- even bits to LH half, odd bits to RH half
- quite regular in structure (easy in h/w)

• example:

IP(675a6967 5e5a6b5a) = (ffb2194d 004df6fb)

Initial Permutation IP

58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2

60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4

62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6

64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8

57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1

59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3

61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5

63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7

• the 1st bit of the output is taken from the 58th bit of the input; the 2nd bit from the 50th bit, and so on, with the last bit of the output taken from the 7th bit of the input.

Inverse IP

DES Round Structure

- uses two 32-bit L & R halves
- as for any Feistel cipher can describe as:

$$L_i = R_{i-1}$$

 $R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus \mathcal{F}(R_{i-1}, K_i)$

- F takes 32-bit R half and 48-bit subkey:
 - expands R to 48-bits using perm E
 - adds to subkey using XOR
 - passes through 8 S-boxes to get 32-bit result
 - finally permutes using 32-bit perm P



Single Iteration of DES Algorithm [Book,William stalling]

DES Round Structure



Expansion Permutation E

32	1	2	3	4	5
4	5	6	7	8	9
8	9	10	11	12	13
12	13	14	15	16	17
16	17	18	19	20	21
20	21	22	23	24	25
24	25	26	27	28	29
28	29	30	31	32	1

Substitution Boxes S

- have eight S-boxes which map 6 to 4 bits
- each S-box is actually 4 little 4 bit boxes
 - outer bits 1 & 6 (row bits) select one row of 4
 - inner bits 2-5 (col bits) are substituted
 - result is 8 lots of 4 bits, or 32 bits
- row selection depends on both data & key
 - feature known as autoclaving (autokeying)
- example:
 - S(18 09 12 3d 11 17 38 39) = 5fd25e03

DES S-box

- 8 "substitution boxes" or S-boxes, S1, S2.... S₈
 For each S-box, input: 6 bits, output: 4 bits Example:
 - S-box: S matrix 4 x 16, values o to 15 Input: 6 bits b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 Row address r: 2 bits(b1 b6), Column address c: 4 bits(b2 b3 b4 b5) Output: binary representation of S(r,c)

DES S-box

• Example S-Box S1

14	4	13	1	2	15	11	8	3	10	6	12	5	9	0	7
6	15	7	4	14	2	13	1	10	6	12	11	9	5	3	8
4	1	14	8	13	6	2	11	15	12	9	7	3	10	5	9
15	12	8	2	4	9	1	7	5	11	3	14	10	0	6	15

Input: 111001, Output: 1010 [row 3 (11), column 12 (1100)]

 | 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111

 00 | 1110 0100 1101 0001 0010 1111 1011 1000 0011 1010 0110 1100 0101 1001 0000 0111

 01 | 0000 1111 0111 0100 1110 0010 1101 0001 1010 0110 1100 1011 1001 0010 0111

 01 | 0100 0001 1110 1000 1110 0010 1101 0001 1010 0110 1100 1011 1001 0011 1000

 01 | 1111 1100 1000 0010 1101 0110 0010 1011 1010 0111 1001 0101 0011 1000

 01 | 1111 1100 0000 0110 0110 0110 0010 1011 1111 1100 1001 0111 0011 1010 0101 0101

DES Key Schedule

forms subkeys used in each round

- initial permutation of the key (PC1) which selects 56-bits in two 28-bit halves
- 16 stages consisting of:
 - rotating each half separately either 1 or 2 places depending on the key rotation schedule K
 - selecting 24-bits from each half & permuting them by PC2 for use in round function F
- note practical use issues in h/w vs s/w

DES Decryption

- decrypt must unwind steps of data computation
- with Feistel design, do encryption steps again using subkeys in reverse order (K16 ... K1)
 - IP undoes final FP step of encryption
 - 1st round with K16 performs 16th encrypt round
 - • • •
 - 16th round with K1 performs 1st encrypt round
 - then final FP undoes initial encryption IP
 - thus recovering original data value

DES Avalanche Effect

- key desirable property of encryption
- where a change of one input or key bit results in changing approx half output bits
- making attempts to "home-in" by guessing keys impossible
- DES exhibits strong avalanche

DES Avalanche Effect

Change	in Plaintext	Change in Key			
Round	No. of bits that differ		Round	No. of bits that differ	
0	1		0	0	
1	6		1	2	
2	21		2	14	
3	35		3	28	
4	39		4	32	
5	34		5	30	
6	32		6	32	
7	31		7	35	
8	29		8	34	
			•		
•			•		
16	34		16	35	

Cryptanalysis of DES

DES Weak Keys

- DES uses 16 48-bits keys generated from a master 56-bit key (64 bits if we consider also parity bits, every 8th bit is parity bit)
- Weak keys: keys make the same sub-key to be generated in more than one round.
- • Result: reduce security
- DES has 4 weak keys (64 bits)

 (i) 01010101 01010101
 (ii) FEFEFEFE FEFEFEFE
 (iii) E0E0E0E0 E0E0E0E0
 (iv) 1F1F1F1F 1F1F1F1F
- If all the sub-keys are identical then encryption function becomes self inverting and using two encryption original plaintext can be found.

 $E_K(E_K(x))=x$, since encryption and decryption are same.

Semi Weak Keys DES

- DES has also semi-weak keys, which only produce two different subkeys, each used eight times in the algorithm
- If K1 and K 2 are two such sub-keys, then they have the property that E_{K1}(E_{K2}(x))=x
- There are six pairs of DES semi-weak keys •
- Weak and semi-weak keys are not considered "flaws" of DES. There are 256 (7.21 × 10¹⁶) possible keys for DES, of which only four are weak and twelve are semiweak ...

Brute Force Attacks on DES

- Known-Plaintext Attack (several pairs of plaintextciphertext are known)
- Try all 2⁵⁶ (= 7.2 x 10¹⁶) possible keys
- brute force search looks hard
- recent advances have shown is possible
 - in 1997 on Internet in 3 months
 - in 1998 on dedicated h/w (EFF) in 3 days
 - in 1999 above combined in 22hrs!

Strength of DES: Analytic Attacks

- now have several analytic attacks on DES
- these utilize some deep structure of the cipher
 - by gathering information about encryptions
 - can eventually recover some/all of the sub-key bits
 - if necessary then exhaustively search for the rest
- generally these are statistical attacks
- include
 - differential cryptanalysis
 - linear cryptanalysis
 - related key attacks

DES Design Criteria

- as reported by Coppersmith in [COPP94]
- 7 criteria for S-boxes provide for
 - non-linearity
 - resistance to differential cryptanalysis
 - good confusion
- 3 criteria for permutation P provide for
 - increased diffusion

Block Cipher Design

- basic principles still like Feistel's in 1970's
- number of rounds
 - more is better, exhaustive search best attack
 - But should be cost-efficient
- function f:
 - provides "confusion", is nonlinear, avalanche
 - have issues of how S-boxes are selected
- key schedule
 - complex subkey creation, key avalanche
 - Key should be random