



# Shannon's Theory of Secrecy System


# Shannon's Information Theory Paper

- “Mathematical Theory of Communication”, published in 1948
- Main claim:
  - All sources of data have a **rate**
  - All channels have a **capacity**
  - If the **capacity** is greater than the **rate**, transmission with **no errors** is possible
- Introduced concept of **entropy** of a random variable/process


# Definition of a Cryptosystem:

- A cryptosystem can be viewed as a distribution of plaintexts  $P$ , a set of ciphertexts  $C$ , a distribution of possible keys ( $K$ ) and an encoding transformation, with its inverse ( $D$ ).

# Definition of Cryptosystem Modern Variations



# Cryptographic Algorithms



# Shannon's 1948 Paper

- Published one year after his monumental “information theory” paper
- “transformed cryptography from art to science”

# Main Contributions

- Notions of **theoretical security** and **practical security**
- Observation that the secret is all in the key, not in the algorithm
- **Product ciphers** and **mixing transformations** – inspiration for **DES, AES** and .....
- Proof that **Vernam's cipher** (one-time pad) was **theoretically secure**

# Theoretical and Practical Security



# Theoretical and Practical Security

- **Theoretically secure** cryptosystems cannot be broken – even by an all-powerful adversary
- **Practically secure** cryptosystems “require a large amount of work to solve”
- Bad news:
  - The only **theoretically secure** cryptosystem is the **one-time pad**
  - The only **practically secure** cryptosystem is... the **one-time pad**

# Shannon's theory

- 1949, “Communication theory of Secrecy Systems” in Bell Systems Tech. Journal.
- Two issues:
  - What is the concept of **perfect secrecy**? Does there any cryptosystem provide perfect secrecy?
    - It is possible when **a key is used for only one encryption**
  - How to evaluate a cryptosystem when many plaintexts are encrypted using the same key?

# Shannon's 1949 Paper

- Approaches to evaluate the security of Cryptosystem
  - Computational Security
  - Provable Security
  - Unconditional Security

# Computational Security

- Concerns the computational effort required to break a cryptosystem

## Definition

A Cryptosystem is said to be computationally Secure if the best algorithm for breaking it requires at least  $N$  operations where  $N$  is some specified, very large number.

Problem - No known cryptosystem can be proved to be secure.

- Specific attack like Exhaustive Key Search

# Provable Security

## Definition

A Cryptosystem is said to be provably Secure if the security of the system can be reduced to some well-studied problem that is considered to be difficult

Example “A given cryptosystem is secure if a given integer  $n$  cannot be factored”

- relative not an absolute proof

# Unconditional Security

## Definition

A cryptosystem is said to be unconditionally secure if it cannot be broken, even with infinite computational resources.

- it cannot be studied from the point of view of computational complexity as we allow computation time is infinite
- can be studied with **Probability Theory**

# One-Time Pad

- Unconditional security !!!
- Described by Gilbert Vernam in 1917
- Use a random key that was truly as long as the message, no repetitions

$$P = C = K = (\mathbb{Z}_2)^n \quad x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \quad K = (K_1, \dots, K_n)$$

$$e_K(x) = (x_1 + K_1, \dots, x_n + K_n) \pmod{2}$$

For ciphertext  $y = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$

$$d_K(y) = (y_1 + K_1, \dots, y_n + K_n) \pmod{2}$$

# Example: one-time pad

- Given ciphertext with Vigenère Cipher:  
ANKYODKYUREPFJBYOJDSPLREYIUNOFDOIUERFPLUYTS

## Decrypt by hacker 1:

CT: ANKYODKYUREPFJBYOJDSPLREYIUNOFDOIUERFPLUYTS  
Key: pxlmvmsydofuyrvzwc tnlebnecvgdupahfzzlmnyih  
PT: mr mustard with the candlestick in the hall

## Decrypt by hacker 2:

CT: ANKYODKYUREPFJBYOJDSPLREYIUNOFDOIUERFPLUYTS  
Key: **pft**gpmiydgaxgoufhklllmhsqdgogtewbqfgyovuhwt  
PT: miss scarlet with the knife in the library

Which one?



# Problem with one-time pad


- Truly random key with arbitrary length?
- Distribution and protection of long keys
  - The key has the same length as the plaintext!
- One-time pad was thought to be unbreakable, but there was no mathematical proof until Shannon developed the concept of perfect secrecy 30 years later.

# Perfect secrecy

- When we discuss the security of a cryptosystem, we should specify the **type of attack** that is being considered
  - Ciphertext-only attack
- **Unconditional security** assumes **infinite computational time**
  - Theory of computational complexity ✕
  - Probability theory ✓

# Perfect secrecy

- **Definition:** A cryptosystem has **perfect secrecy** if  $\Pr[x|y] = \Pr[x]$  for all  $x \in P, y \in C$
- Idea: Oscar can obtain no information about the plaintext by observing the ciphertext



# Elementary Probability Theory

# Discrete random variable

- **Def:** A *discrete random variable*, say  $\mathbf{X}$ , consists of a **finite set**  $X$  and a **probability distribution** defined on  $X$ .
- The probability that the random variable  $\mathbf{X}$  takes on the value  $x$  is denoted  $\Pr[\mathbf{X}=x]$  or  $\Pr[x]$
- $0 \leq \Pr[x]$  for all  $x \in X$ ,  $\sum_{x \in X} \Pr[x] = 1$

# Discrete random variable

- Ex. Consider a coin toss to be a random variable defined on {head, tails}, the associated probabilities  $\Pr[\text{head}] = \Pr[\text{tail}] = 1/2$
- Ex. Throw a pair of dice. It is modeled by  $Z = \{(1,1), (1,2), \dots, (2,1), (2,2), \dots, (6,6)\}$   
where  $\Pr[(i,j)] = 1/36$  for all  $i, j$ .  
sum=4 corresponds to  $\{(1,3), (2,2), (3,1)\}$  with probability  $3/36$

# Joint and conditional probability

- $X$  and  $Y$  are random variables defined on finite sets  $X$  and  $Y$ , respectively.
- **Def:** the **joint probability**  $\Pr[x, y]$  is the probability that  $X=x$  and  $Y=y$
- **Def:** the **conditional probability**  $\Pr[x/y]$  is the probability that  $X=x$  given  $Y=y$

$$\Pr[x, y] = \Pr[x/y]\Pr[y] = \Pr[y/x]\Pr[x]$$

# Bayes' theorem

$$\Pr[x | y] = \frac{\Pr[x] \Pr[y | x]}{\Pr[y]}$$

- If  $\Pr[y] > 0$ , then
- Ex. Let  $X$  denote the sum of two dice.


$Y$  is a random variable on  $\{D, N\}$ ,  $Y=D$  if the two dice are the same. (double)

$$\Pr[D | 4] = \frac{\Pr[4 | D] \Pr[D]}{\Pr[4]} = \frac{(1/6)(1/6)}{3/36} = \frac{1}{3}$$




# Definitions

- Assume a cryptosystem  $(P,C,K,E,D)$  is specified, and a key is used for one encryption
- Plaintext is denoted by random variable  $x$
- Key is denoted by random variable  $K$
- Ciphertext is denoted by random variable  $y$



# Perfect secrecy

- **Definition:** A cryptosystem has **perfect secrecy** if  $\Pr[x|y] = \Pr[x]$  for all  $x \in P, y \in C$
- Idea: Oscar can obtain no information about the plaintext by observing the ciphertext



# Relations among $\mathbf{x}$ , $\mathbf{K}$ , $\mathbf{y}$

- Ciphertext is a function of  $\mathbf{x}$  and  $\mathbf{K}$

$$\Pr[\mathbf{y} = y] = \sum_{\{K: y \in C(K)\}} \Pr[\mathbf{K} = K] \Pr[\mathbf{x} = d_K(y)]$$

- $\mathbf{y}$  is the ciphertext, given that  $\mathbf{x}$  is the plaintext

$$\Pr[\mathbf{y} = y \mid \mathbf{x} = x] = \sum_{\{K: x = d_K(y)\}} \Pr[\mathbf{K} = K]$$

# Relations among $\mathbf{x}$ , $\mathbf{K}$ , $\mathbf{y}$

- $\mathbf{x}$  is the plaintext, given that  $\mathbf{y}$  is the ciphertext

$$\Pr[\mathbf{x} = x \mid \mathbf{y} = y] = \frac{\Pr[x] \Pr[y \mid x]}{\Pr[y]}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\mathbf{x} = x] \times \sum_{\{K: x = d_K(y)\}} \Pr[\mathbf{K} = K] \\ = & \frac{\Pr[\mathbf{x} = x] \times \sum_{\{K: x = d_K(y)\}} \Pr[\mathbf{K} = K]}{\sum_{\{K: y \in C(K)\}} \Pr[\mathbf{K} = K] \Pr[\mathbf{x} = d_K(y)]} \end{aligned}$$

## Ex. Shift cipher has perfect secrecy

- **Shift cipher:**  $P=C=K=Z_{26}$  , encryption is defined as
- Ciphertext:

$$e_K(x) = (x + K) \bmod 26$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathbf{y} = y] &= \sum \Pr[\mathbf{K} = K] \Pr[\mathbf{x} = d_K(y)] \\ &= \sum_{K \in Z_{26}} \frac{1}{26} \Pr[x = y - K] \\ &= \frac{1}{26} \sum_{K \in Z_{26}} \Pr[x = y - K] = \frac{1}{26} \end{aligned}$$

Ex. Shift cipher has perfect secrecy

$$= \Pr[\mathbf{K} = (y - x) \bmod 26] = \frac{1}{26}$$

- $\Pr[y|x]$
- Apply Bayes' theorem

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[x | y] &= \frac{\Pr[x] \Pr[y | x]}{\Pr[y]} \\ &= \frac{\Pr[x] \frac{1}{26}}{\frac{1}{26}} = \Pr[x]\end{aligned}$$

Perfect secrecy

# Perfect secrecy when $|K|=|C|=|P|$

- $(P,C,K,E,D)$  is a cryptosystem where  $|K|=|C|=|P|$ .
- The cryptosystem provides **perfect secrecy** iff
  - every keys is used with **equal probability**  $1/|K|$
  - For every  $x \in P$ ,  $y \in C$ , there is a unique key  $K$  such that

Ex. One-time pad in  $Z_2$

$$e_K(x) = y$$

# Shannon's Product Ciphers and Modern Encryption Algorithms



# Product Cryptosystems

- Different cryptosystems can be combined to create a new cryptosystem.
- Given two cryptosystems with the same message space, consider a probabilistic combination of the two systems: with probability  $p$  use system A, otherwise use system B.

# Product Cryptosystems


- Another way to use two cryptosystems is to encrypt and decrypt messages consecutively. We call this a **product cipher**.
- He believes that a combination of an initial transposition (Permutation) with alternating substitutions and linear operations may do the trick.
- Both DES and AES use Shannon's ideas of Product System and of type Substitution Permutation Network (SPN).

# Conventional Encryption Principles

- Basic ingredients of the scheme:
  - a) Plaintext (P)
    - Message to be encrypted
  - b) Secret Key (K)
    - Shared among the two parties
  - c) Ciphertext (C)
    - Message after encryption
  - d) Encryption algorithm
    - Uses P and K
  - e) Decryption algorithm
    - Uses C and K

# Types of algorithms

- Private Key : The encryption key and decryption key are easily derivable from each other
  - Block Cipher : Fixed blocks of data
  - Stream Cipher : Block Size = 1
- Public Key : Infeasible to determine the decryption key,  $d$  from the encryption key,  $e$ .

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- Security of the scheme
    - Depends on the secrecy of the key
    - Does not depend on the secrecy of the algorithm
  - Assumptions that we make:
    - Algorithms for encryption/decryption are known to the public
    - Keys used are kept secret

# Simplified Model of Encryption/Decryption

